We study experimentally whether the endowment effect survives in a social and strategic context. Participants are asked for their Willingness--to--Accept (WTA) or Willingness--to--Pay (WTP) to play a series of 2x2 games. In the second part of the experiment, we study the endowment effect in lotteries with the same payoffs as the games in the first part. Our findings provide robust evidence for the endowment effect both in games and in lotteries, with the size of the effect actually being larger in games than in lotteries. We also find that the endowment effect can partly be attributed to optimism.
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Introduction
We report on an experimental test whether the so--called 'endowment effect' exists when decisions are made in a strategic context. The endowment effect is observed when individuals place a higher value on a good when they are endowed with it, compared to when they are not. A large body of experimental studies has documented considerable evidence that provides support for the existence of the endowment effect in relation to individual decision--making (for a recent overview see Ericson and Fuster 2014) . Most of these studies show that the entitlement affects the value of goods:
average willingness--to--accept (WTA) values are greater than willingness--to--pay (WTP) values 1 .
Endowment effect studies typically focus on situations where individuals are asked to trade consumption goods such as mugs, chocolate bars and pens (e.g., Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990; Shogren et al. 1994 ; Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1994) , less common consumption goods such as premium chocolate candys and tasting bitter liquids (e.g., Coursey et al., 1987; Bateman et al., 1997) , or lottery tickets (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Harless, 1989; Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Singh, 1991) . We extend this literature by exploring whether the endowment effect survives in strategic and social contexts. In the experiment participants have either the right to play a game and are asked for their WTA, or they do not have the right to play and are asked for their WTP. The decision making context that our design analyses allows us to elicit information (such as individuals' expectations about outcomes) which may help explain the endowment effect.
In general it is far from obvious that regularities in individual decision--making will also be observed in a strategic context. According to Simon (1955) bounded rationality is characterized by the use of heuristics, and what heuristics are used depends very much on the context. Because the attention of the decision maker may focus on different aspects in a more complex and strategic situation, it is not a matter of course that observed behaviour in individual decision--making generalizes to such setting.
In our experiment we employ several different games. Coordination games can be considered to be in character close to a lottery (at least in theory), and because the endowment effect seems to be very robust for lotteries, we may expect to find evidence of the endowment effect also in these games. We use also other games, like the chicken game and the prisoners' dilemma. In these games social preferences and beliefs about the actions of others may play an important role, which makes the situation more complex and less similar to a lottery.
Interestingly, the recent literature Zeiler 2005, 2011; Isoni, Loomes and Sugden 2011) suggests that the endowment effect is more robust in lotteries than in consumption goods like mugs or chocolate 2 . An obvious difference between a consumption good and a lottery is uncertainty.
Although there may be uncertainty about the quality of a consumption good (or the satisfaction in using it), experimental procedures typically make sure that participants have the opportunity to examine the good before the WTA or WTP elicitation. However, the uncertainty in a lottery is an explicit risk. There are (at least) two possible explanations for the fascinating finding that the endowment effect is stronger in lotteries than in consumption goods. First, an interesting hypothesis by Bayrak et al. (2015) is that the expected utility of the good will be imprecisely estimated by the decision--maker and is more like an interval. 3 If the reported WTP and WTA values are "on the safe side", that is high in the interval for a WTA and low for a WTP (or, in the terminology of Yang et al.
2013
, decision makers have an aversion to bad deals) a WTA--WTP gap is created. Establishing a subjective utility will be harder for a lottery than for a consumption good, which makes the intervals larger and the endowment effect stronger and more robust. Note that in games the task is even more complex as there is strategic uncertainty and the decision maker has to form beliefs about the actions of others, which would make it even harder to establish a subjective utility. This would make the endowment effect even stronger in games than in lotteries.
A second possible explanation for the robustness of the endowment effect in lotteries is optimism.
Optimism is very common and it is even considered in the western culture to be an appealing personality trait (see Ehrenreich 2009 for a review). In case of optimism (or pessimism) subjective beliefs about the occurrence of an event are positively (negatively) dependent on the consequences of the event for the decision--maker. An optimist who owns a lottery ticket will think it is more likely that his ticket will win than a ticket not owned by him, which leads to a higher subjective expected value of a lottery ticket that is owned. Such distorted beliefs would lead to a difference in WTA and WTP values. Note that this hypothesis is impossible to test in an experiment using lotteries, because it does not make much sense to ask an experimental participant for a subjective belief after providing the objective probability (because the objective probability would be an obvious "right answer"). However, in games there is strategic uncertainty and no objective probability. If optimism were an explanation for the WPA--WTP gap, we would expect a higher subjective expected value of a game that is owned than of a game that is not owned. Because beliefs in the games are elicited, we 2 However, a recent paper by Fehr, Hakimov and Kübler (2015) find no difference between consumption goods and lotteries. 3 Recent findings in neuroscience suggest that when a decision maker estimates subjective value, confidence is automatically coded in the same region of the brain, see Lebreton et al. (2015) . This confidence can be regarded as a judgment on the correctness of the valuation. A low confidence is analogous to a large interval in the Bayrak et al. (2015) hypothesis.
can test the optimism hypothesis by comparing the subjective expected value of the games in WTA and WTP periods.
In the second part of the experiment we study the endowment effect in lotteries. This is done for two reasons. First, if it so happens that we do not observe an endowment effect in games, this might have been caused by specific circumstances, like the subject pool, instructions, etc. In that case a null result would be more meaningful if we could show that the same participants show an endowment effect in lotteries. Second, since we elicit the subjective beliefs about the play of others, there is a direct relation between games and lotteries. For example, when a player expects that other players select "A" with a probability of 40% while they themselves play "B", the value of the game should be equal to the value of lottery where with 40% probability the payoff is equal to the payoff in the game with a (B,A) outcome and with 60% the payoff is equal to the game payoff for the (B,B) outcome (abstracting from social preferences). In the second part of the experiment participants face lotteries that are based upon the games of the first part, using either the mixed Nash equilibrium (which we refer to as "fixed lotteries", see the design section) or the individual subjective beliefs measured in the first part (which we refer to as "subjective lotteries") as the corresponding probabilities.
The next section will discuss the experimental design in detail, in section 3 the results will be presented and section 4 concludes.
Experimental design
The experiment consists of two parts. In the first part WTA and WTP values for participation in games were elicited. In addition, we ask for a choice in each game and we elicit expectations about the behaviour of others. In the second part WTA and WTP values for lotteries were elicited. We will first explain how the WTA and WTP values are elicited, then we will discuss the games employed in the experiment, how the lotteries of part two are constructed and we end the design section with the procedures. All the on--screen instructions, the paper handouts and relevant screenshots are included in the appendix.
The implementation of the Becker--DeGroot--Marchak (BDM) procedure
We use the BDM procedure to elicit WTA and WTP values. The BDM procedure is a standard elicitation mechanism in the endowment effect literature. In brief, participants are asked to report their WTA or WTP values (in periods when they have or do not have the right to play, respectively), which they are told should be between 0 and 8 Euros. Whether they then actually play the game is determined by comparing their WTA/WTP value to a random draw on the interval [0, 8] Euros. For WTP periods, participants will take part in the game as long as the randomly drawn number does not exceed their stated WTP. Similarly, for WTA periods participants will take part in the game as long as the randomly drawn number is lower than their stated WTA.
Since this is not a straightforward procedure for participants to understand, we started each session with detailed instructions explaining this elicitation mechanism. We provided numerical examples in order for participants to understand why it is optimal for them to report a WTA/WTP value that is equal to their own true value. Our instructions follow closely the examples as described in Isoni et al. (2011) . Just before the start of the session, we put the exact amount of the random bids in a sealed envelope (together with the random draws of the payoff relevant periods), which is placed on a whiteboard in the laboratory. This information is revealed to participants at the very end of the experiment and determines whether participants have bought or sold their right to play the game.
Part 1: Games
The first part has 20 periods. In the odd periods, participants get "the right to play" and report their WTA value. In the even periods, they do not have the right to play and report their WTP value. In all periods they make a choice in case that period is paid out and they did buy or did not sell the game,
and their expectations about the play of others. To make it easier for participants to distinguish between WTA and WTP periods, the differences between these periods are highlighted in green and purple colours, respectively (see figure 1 ). In total, we elicited WTA/WTP values for ten games, which are outlined in Table 1 . Our games differ in three respects. First, we have included four different types of games. These are Coordination games (1, 4, 6 and 9), Stag hunt games (3 and 8), Chicken games (2 and 7), and Prisoner's dilemma games (5 and 10). Second, the mixed equilibrium percentages can be 30%--70% (Games 7 and 9), 50%--50% (Games 1, 2, 4 and 6), 60%--40% (Games 3 and 8) or no mixed strategy equilibrium (the Prisoners' Dilemma Games 5 and 10). Third, we vary the presence of negative payoffs depending on the action chosen. Games 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 only have positive payoffs, whereas, Games 6, 7, 8 and 10 include negative payoffs as well.
Notice that half of the games for which WTP is elicited are obtained by adding 1 euro to the corresponding WTA game and for the other half of the games for which WTP is elicited are obtained by subtracting 1 euro from corresponding WTA game. For example, in Game 1, the WTP game is obtained by adding 1 euro to the WTA variant of the game. This feature of the design is particularly well suited for making within--subject comparisons of WTP and WTA, and is equivalent to the manipulation of lotteries in Isoni et al. (2011) . In addition, another characteristic of our games is that row and column players are symmetric. This is done for practical reasons to avoid introducing different roles of row and column players. Note that participants did not receive feedback about the play of others during the experiment, which eliminates the possibility of learning 4 . The order of the games was the same for all participants.
An interesting element of strategic interaction situations (as opposed to individual decision making)
is that a particular choice of an action may depend on participant's beliefs about the opponent's actions. Clearly, the beliefs of participants are likely to influence their stated values. For example, in the Prisoner's dilemma Game 5 (see table 1), if a participant believes that his/her opponent will choose B with certainty, his/her willingness to pay for this game will not be more than 3 money units. It was therefore important to elicit participants' beliefs about how many participants in a session will choose a specific action (A or B). The elicitation of beliefs was incentivised; at the end of the experiment the expectations in one randomly determined period are compared with actual choices of 10 other participants in that session and paid out.
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The use of participants' beliefs becomes particularly important for the second part of the experiment, which is described below.
Part 2: Lotteries
After the first part of the experiment is completed, we also elicited information about participants' WTA/WTP valuations for 27 lotteries (54 periods). The lottery parameters that we used in our experiment are transformations of the parameters we used in each of the games outlined in Table 1 .
For example, from the WTA version of Game 1, we obtained the following two lotteries: A = (€2, 0.5; €4, 0.5) and B = (€6, 0.5; €0, 0.5). Of these lotteries 15 lotteries are "fixed lotteries" which use as probabilities the mixed strategy equilibriums of each game and 12 are "subjective lotteries" for which we used as percentages the elicited beliefs from the first part of the experiment. This was done only in the games where the mixed strategy equilibrium was different from 50%--50%. When the participant reported different beliefs in the WTA and WTP version of the game, we took the average of these beliefs. The comparison of the WTA/WTP values between the first and the second part provides us with an insightful within--subject comparison, which allows us to study how the size 4 When we designed the experiment we thought about the possibility that sophisticated participants may anticipate that if they play the game they are more likely to meet an opponent who values the game highly, and this may tell something about the action of the opponent. For example, in WTA game 2 (chicken) one can expect a rational player who values the game higher than 4 to play B (because the maximum value of playing A is 4). However, we have chosen the range of possible random bids quite large, from 0 to 8 euros, and therefore it is likely that either almost everybody or almost nobody will play the game and thus the fact that someone plays does give only little information about the private valuation and (indirectly) the action. 5 For the belief elicitation task, we asked participants to indicate how many (out of 10 randomly selected) other participants have chosen action A and how many have chosen action B. Clearly, the sum of these two numbers should be equal to 10. The earnings are the number of correct predictions made, times 50 cents. For example, if the participant reported that 7 participants would choose A and 3 participants would choose B and we find that in fact 4 participants have chosen A and 6 participants have chosen B, 4 A--choices and 3 B--choices are correctly guessed and the earnings are 7*50 cents is 3.50 euros.
of the endowment effect in strategic decision--making situations compares with the size of the endowment effect in payoff--equivalent individual decision--making situations (lotteries). The full set of lotteries that we used is provided in Appendix A. The order of the lotteries was the same for all participants, and we made sure that related lotteries were presented with at least 4 periods in between.
Procedures
The experiment is programmed in PHP/mysql and starts with a set of general instructions about the BDM procedure, with many examples, very much like the experiment reported by Isoni et al. (2011) . This is followed by instructions about the task in part 1: the good is the right to play a game; we explain how to read a matrix game; we explain the task in each period (making a choice, reporting beliefs and value). After all participants have finished the instructions and have correctly answered the questions that check understanding, the first part of 20 periods starts.
After the last period of part 1 the participants receive the instructions of part 2 and make their 54 decisions for part 2. What periods would be paid, and the random values were randomly determined just before the session and put in a sealed envelop and put on the whiteboard, visible for all participants. After all participants have finished part 2, the sealed envelope is opened and the earnings are determined. Participants are paid according to their decisions in one randomly determined period in part 1 (games), the accuracy of their expectations in one (possibly different) randomly determined period in part 1 (games), and their decision in one randomly determined period in part 2 (lotteries).
To calculate the earnings for the selected period of part 1, we first compare the value reported by the participant with the random bid in the envelope. The game is played out when the participant had the right to play the game (WTA case) and did not sell that right because the random bid was lower than his reported value, or, when the participant did not have the right to play the game (WTP case) and did buy that right because the random bid was higher than his reported value. In this case the participant is paired with a randomly selected participant, who also did not sell or did buy the right to play the game. The actual choices of each pair together determine their final payoff.
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When 6 It might be the case that we end up with an odd number of participants who have the right to play. In this case, to avoid having problems with forming groups of two, we have randomly selected one participant (the identity of which is not known to anybody) at the beginning of the experiment, who may not play according to her/his preferences. If the randomly selected participant has the right to play the game, then s/he will not play the game. If the randomly selected participant does not have the right to play the game, then s/he will play the game (and their choices in the respective game will determine their payoff). Note that, in a session of 20 participants, the probability of being this randomly selected participant is very low (about 2.5%, because in the participant did sell the right to play game (WTA case) the participant receives the amount of the random bid. A participant who did not buy the right to play the game (WTP case) will not play the game. A similar procedure is used for part 2, only now no coupling is needed. Finally, participants filled in a short questionnaire (gender, age, field of study) before getting paid and leaving the lab.
Results
The experiment was run in the CREED laboratory of the University of Amsterdam and 116 participants (47% male and 53% female, 69% were students of economics or business and the remainder were mostly students in other social sciences) earned on average 22.50 euros in about 1.5 hours. The data of two participants are excluded from the analyses because they obviously did not take the task seriously: one participant filled in 8 euros for all WTA and WTP questions and another participant filled in only amounts between 0 and 1 euro for all WTP and WTA questions.
Because of a minor technical problem we missed the data of one decision in part 1 and 3 decisions in part 2 of the first session. The WTP games and lotteries are constructed by adding or subtracting one euro from the corresponding WTA game or lottery (see design section); for the analyses we respectively subtracted and added 1 euro to the WTP values, to make WTA and WTP values easily comparable.
The first question to be answered is whether there is an endowment effect in games. Table 2 shows the WTA and WTP valuation per game. In 9 out of 10 games the average WTA is larger than the WTP, and this difference in statistically significant in 7 games. In 3 games, we find no significant WTA--WTP differences. Recall that we employ a within--subject design for each game, and every pair of observations can be classified as either EE (WTA>WTP), anti--EE (WTA<WTP) and no--EE (WTA=WTP).
Overall we find the endowment effect in about 63%, anti--endowment effect in 26%, and exactly the same valuations (no--EE) in 11% of the cases. Game 2 is the only game with a tendency against the endowment effect (although the effect is not statistically significant), but we can see no clear explanation for this: it is a chicken game but so is game 7, which shows a clear EE. The average gap between WTP and WTA is 84 cents.
about half of the cases the number of participants who have the right to play will be odd, and there is a 5% probability to be the randomly selected participant). Note: Per participant the number of games for which the participant displayed the endowment effect (EE), anti--endowment effect (anti--EE) or no endowment effect (no--EE). The participants are ordered on the occurrence of the EE. Note: Optimism is the subjective expected value of the WTA minus the subjective expected value of the WTP game) per game.
If the endowment effect is caused by optimism, the subjective expected value (based upon the decision and the subjective beliefs of the participant) of a WTA--game should be larger than the respective value of the corresponding WTP--game. Figure 3 shows the average optimism (defined as the difference in the subjective expected value between the WTA and the WTP games) for all games, separately for the cases where an endowment effect was observed or not. Although over all cases no optimism is observed (2 cents positive, not statistically significant from 0), in EE cases we find on average optimism (10.7 cents, p=0.019 Wilcoxon test) and in no--EE cases we find on average Mean no EE Mean EE is presented at the end of the results section (Table 6) . By performing linear regressions, we show a significant effect of optimism.
Result 2: Optimism can partly explain the endowment effect in games: the size of the endowment effect is positively correlated with the size of optimism.
The next question is whether we find an endowment effect in lotteries as well. We have to distinguish between two kinds of lotteries, the fixed and subjective ones. The probabilities in the fixed lotteries are based upon the mixed Nash equilibrium and are thus the same for everyone. The subjective lotteries are based upon the beliefs in the game as reported by that specific participant, and these will thus differ between participants. of the games while only 9/114 and 8/114 participants exhibit respectively "No EE" and "Anti EE" in at least for 60% of the games, see figure B--1 in the appendix.
The subjective lotteries are based upon the beliefs of the participant in the related game in part 1. A participant reports beliefs both in the WTA and WTP version of a game and for the probability in the lottery we use the average of these two beliefs. Table 4 shows a statistically significant endowment effect in 10 out of the 12 subjective lotteries.
Result 3:
We find a strong endowment effect both for the fixed and the subjective lotteries. A second way to compare the endowment effect in games and lotteries is to compare the decisions in a given game with the decisions in the related subjective lottery. Note that when a participant has the same beliefs in the WTA and WTP game, and chooses the same action, the game is equivalent to the lottery with the only difference that the probabilities in the lottery are given (objective) while the probabilities in the game are subjective (assuming no social preferences). The beliefs about the actions of others in a game are measured in increments of 10%, and when the beliefs in the WTA and WTP game differ only by 10% or less (for example 30% and 40%, respectively) we can consider both beliefs as being equivalent to the average (35% in the example). However, when the beliefs differ more than 10%, we cannot relate the lottery with the game anymore. Table 5 shows the comparison between the endowment effect in games and the related subjective lotteries, for the cases with the same actions and about the same beliefs in the WTA and WTP games (54% of all cases). Comparing the games/actions with the lotteries we find equally often the larger effect in the game as in the lottery, but in many rows there are only few observations and thus low statistical power. The significant (3--A and 5--A) and also the marginally significant (3--B) differences are all in the direction of a larger effect in games than in lotteries, and also overall we find that the gap is larger in games than in lotteries (average of 87 versus 65 cents) 7 .
Result 4:
The average size of the endowment effect is statistically significant larger in the games than in the lotteries. and 0.570 (subjective), and, unsurprisingly, the gaps in the two kinds of lotteries are even more highly correlated: 0.871.
Result 5:
Participants who are prone to the endowment effect in lotteries are more likely to be prone to the endowment effect in games. 7 We have rerun the analysis with also the cases included where the actions in the WTA and WTP game are different (which could be caused by a mixed strategy). This increases the number of cases to 420, and the results are very much the same: the average gap in the games are 87 and in lotteries 61 cents; this difference is statistically significant (p=0.001, Wilcoxon test). 8 We cannot rule out an order effect; the lotteries part of the experiment is always and necessarily after the games part, because we needed the beliefs in the games part to construct the subjective lotteries. Notes: Only the cases where the actions in the WTA and WTP game are the same and the beliefs in the two games differ at most 10% are considered. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. In the last column, we report the two--sided p--value from a Wilcoxon sign rank test for the comparison of the WTA--WTP gaps in the games and lotteries. Table 6 displays OLS regressions in which some of the findings discussed above are combined. The dependent variable is always the WTA--WTP gap in games. In the first column we find a significant contribution of optimism as defined by the difference in the subjective expected value of a WTA and WTP game. In the second column a dummy variable representing the gender of the participant is added (1 if female and 0 if male), with an interaction effect with optimism (as separate regressor). We find that females display on average a smaller endowment effect. This is surprising, because the literature generally assumes that the endowment effect is caused by loss aversion, and numerous studies have shown that on average females are more loss averse than males (e.g. Schmidt and Traub 2002, Booij and van de Kuilen 2009) . The interaction effect is not significant, so optimism seems to have the same effect on both sexes. In the third column the individual average endowment effect in lotteries is added to the equation. As expected from result 5 above, this effect is highly significant. The coefficients of the optimism and gender are similar across the three regression models. In the fourth column we add an interaction term of optimism and the endowment effect in lotteries. This interaction effect is positive, and the coefficient of optimism becomes insignificant. This means that optimism mainly explains the endowment effect in games of those individuals that are more susceptible to the endowment effect in lotteries, as measured in part 2. Notes. This table displays the results of four OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the size of the endowment effect in the game: the WTA--WTP. In column 1 optimism is the independent variable, In column 2 gender and an interaction effect gender*optimism is added, and in column 3 and 4 the average individual endowment effect in lotteries and interaction effect with optimism are added. Optimism is the subjective expected value (based upon the decision and the subjective beliefs of the participant) of a WTA--game minus the subjective expected value of the corresponding WTP--game. EE--lotteries the average size of the endowment effect in the fixed lotteries, per individual. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ** (***) denotes statistical significance on the 0.01 (0.001) level.
Conclusion
The endowment effect, or the Willingness--To--Accept (WTA) Willingness--To--Pay (WTP) gap, has been studied in hundreds of experiments since the eighties (starting with Knetsch and Sinden 1984) . Nevertheless there is no general agreement on what drives the effect.
Originally, the endowment effect was attributed only to loss aversion (Thaler 1980, Kahneman et al. 1991) . Loss aversion is an essential part of Prospect Theory and the endowment effect can be considered as an illustration of loss aversion in a situation without risk (Kahneman et al. 1991 and decision makers may have only a fuzzy (interval) valuation of the good (Bayrak et al 2015) , and to prevent a "bad deal" they ask (bid) a price at the high (low) end of the interval.
In this paper we add another explanation: optimism will cause a higher valuation of an uncertain prospect when that prospect is owned compared with when it is not owned. Of course, human behavior is multi--determined and these explanations are not exclusive. Each explanation may play a smaller or larger role, depending on the circumstances and individual differences.
In this paper we report an experimental study about the endowment effect in a strategic context: participants have either the right to play a game and are asked for their WTA, or they do not have a right to play and are asked for their WTP. In line with Isoni et al (2011) we use the Becker--deGroot--Marschak procedure and a within--subject design. We also elicit the beliefs about the play of others, and the participant's action in case he keeps or buys the right to play. Because beliefs are measured, we can measure the optimism of the decision--maker, which is the difference of the subjective expected value of the game when the right to play is owned minus the subjective value when this right is not owned. In the second part of the experiment the endowment effect is measured with lotteries that are related to the games of the first part.
To summarize our results: We find a strong endowment effect in most of the games (result 1) we study and this effect is positively and significantly related with optimism (result 2). The second part of the experiment replicates the findings of Isoni et al. (2011) : we find a strong endowment effect in lotteries (result 3). Interestingly, we find that the endowment effect is stronger in games than in lotteries (result 4). And finally, there exists a significant correlation between the average individual endowment effect in games and lotteries (result 5).
Two things stand out from these results: first, we find the endowment effect in games and that this effect is larger in games than in lotteries. Second, we find a relation between optimism and the endowment effect. Although there are many studies on the effect of optimism (and overconfidence) on human decision--making (e.g. Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Malmendier and Tate 2008) , never before (to our knowledge) a link was made with the endowment effect. An optimist will estimate the potential value of a good he owns higher than of a good he does not own. Our result is in line with studies that find the WTA--WTP gap is not so much caused by too low WTP values but too high WTA values (e.g. Coursey et al. 1987 ).
The findings of Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011) suggest that the endowment effect is stronger in lotteries than in consumption goods and we find that the effect is even stronger in games. In games there is strategic uncertainty, while in lotteries the risk is explicit and in consumption goods the only uncertainty is about the quality of the good. This suggests that uncertainty is an important aspect for the endowment effect to occur. This challenges the traditional interpretation of the endowment effect as evidence of loss--aversion in situations without risk. In addition, if the WTA--WTP gap is interpreted as caused only by loss--aversion, the average loss--aversion parameter 9 in our study is in the range of 1.15--1.20, which is much lower than the approximately 2 often found in Prospect Theory studies.
Although already many studies exist on the endowment effect, we believe that there are promising directions for future research. First, the endowment effect can be studied in situations that are more social and less anonymous than the present study. If the endowment effect is (irrational) heuristic behavior, we would expect the effect to decrease, in line with studies that find smaller anomalies when decision makers have to justify their actions to other (Lerner and Tetlock 1999 
Instructions
The experiment consists of two parts. Part 2 will be explained after we have finished Part 1.
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and may depend on other participants' decisions. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. At the beginning of this experiment, you will receive a show--up fee of 7 euros.
Your decisions in the experiment are private to you. We ask that you do not communicate with other people during the experiment. Please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur during the experiment. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of these rules.
In this experiment you will be asked to buy or sell a certain item. We will first explain the buying task and we will then proceed to the selling task.
Buying task
The buying task works as follows. The experimenter will offer an item for sale. Your task is to make an offer for the item.
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the maximum you would be willing to pay for the item and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this amount, and it will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the maximum you would be willing to pay and make that amount your offer.
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to your offer and to the offers of all other persons in the room.
If your offer is more than or the same as the fixed offer, then you buy the item. You had the high offer, so you are the buyer. But, here's the interesting part: You do not pay the amount you offered. Instead, you pay the fixed offer, an amount equal to or less than your offer.
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 950, you have the high offer. You buy the item and pay only 950. If your offer is less than the fixed offer then you do not buy the item. Instead, you keep your money.
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 1,020, you do not have the high offer. Therefore, you do not buy the item. You keep your money.
As a buyer, you should offer exactly the maximum amount you would be willing to pay in exchange for the item being sold. Your best strategy is to determine your personal value for the item and record that value as your offer. There is not necessarily a "correct" value. Personal values can differ from individual to individual.
The following example illustrates how you work out what's the maximum you are willing to pay.
Imagine that I am a buyer and Item A is up for sale. How do I know what amount is the maximum I'd be willing to pay for Item A? Start with 1 cent. Would I be willing to pay 1 cent for the item? If so, then increase the amount to 2 cent. If I'm willing to pay 2 cent, then increase further. I keep increasing until I come to an amount that makes me indifferent between keeping the money and getting Item A. The key to determining the maximum you'd be willing to pay is remembering that you will not pay the amount you bid. Instead, if you pay anything, you will pay the fixed offer.
Why is my best strategy to bid the maximum I'd be willing to pay? Let's go back to the example:
Say that I decide that the maximum I'd be willing to pay for Item A is €5.25.
What happens if I bid less than €5.25? Say I bid €5. If the fixed offer is, say, €5.10, then I don't get the item. Had I bid €5.25, I would have received the item and had to pay only €5.10 for an item that I think is worth €5.25. I lose out.
What happens if I bid higher than €5.25? Say I bid €5.50. If the fixed offer is €5.45, then I have to pay €5.45 for an item that I really think is worth only €5.25. I lose out.
Selling task
The selling task works as follows. The experimenter wishes to buy an item that you own. Your task is to make an offer for the item.
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the minimum you would be willing to accept and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this amount, and it will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the minimum you would be willing to accept and make that amount your offer.
If your offer is less than or the same as the fixed offer, then you sell the item. You had the low offer, so you are the seller. But, here's the interesting part. You do not receive your offer. Instead, you receive the fixed offer, a price equal to or higher than your offer.
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 1,020, you have the low offer. You sell the item and you receive the fixed offer of 1,020. If your offer is more than the fixed offer then you do not sell your item. You keep the item.
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 950, you do not have the low offer. Therefore, you do not sell the item.
As a seller, you should offer the minimum amount you would be willing to accept in exchange for the item you own. Just as you saw in the case of the buying task, your best strategy is to determine your personal value for the item and record that value as your offer. There is not necessarily a "correct" value. Personal values can differ from individual to individual. The key to determining the minimum you'd be willing to accept is remembering that you will not receive the amount you ask for. Instead, if you receive anything, you will always get the fixed offer. 
Offers in the buying or selling task
Offers in the buying and selling task are previously generated and are between 0.00 and 8.00 euro (all numbers are equally likely). In order to assure you that the fixed offers are completely unrelated to your offers or your personal value of the item, they were randomly generated before the start of the experiment. The offers are printed, put in a closed envelope and attached to the whiteboard. If you like, you can after the experiment check that the envelope contains indeed the offers used to determine you earnings. In the envelope, there are also the randomly determined periods that will be paid.
The item you buy or sell is the right to play a game
We didn't tell you yet what the item is that you will buy or sell. In the first part of the experiment this item will be the right to play a game.
At the beginning of a period you will see a two person game, similar to the one displayed below. In some periods you will have the right to play this game and we will ask you the minimum amount you are willing to accept to sell this right to the experimenter. In other periods you will not have the right to play this game and we will ask you the maximum amount you are willing to pay to purchase this right.
This is only an illustration of the kind of game you will find in the experiment; we will not use a game with these exact numbers in the experiment itself. The first column in the table displays your options (A and B) and the first row of the table displays the options of the other player (also A and B). The other cells in the table display the payoff for each of the players for that combination of choices. Your payoffs (first number in each cell) are printed in red and the payoffs of the other player (second number in each cell) in blue. For example, if you choose A and the other player chooses B, you will earn 1 euro and the other player will earn 0 euros, and if both players choose A, each player will earn 4 euros. Note that the numbers indicated in each cell will always correspond to Euro amounts.
What action do you choose?
In each game we will ask you what action (A or B) you choose, if you would have the right to play this game. If, at the end of the experiment, that period is (randomly) chosen to paid, we will open an envelope to find the fixed offer and first determine whether you have the right to play the game. If you have this right (either because you had the right to start with and didn't sell it, or because you purchased that right), you payoff will be determined by the action you have chosen and the action of another player in this room you will be coupled with.
What action do you expect others to choose?
In addition we are interested in your expectations about the behaviour of other players in this game.
In each period we ask you how many out of 10 randomly drawn participants in this room will have chosen A and B. You will fill in these expectations in the cells below the table of the game.
You can earn money by predicting well. At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose one period and compare your expectation with the actual choices of 10 other participants. Your earnings are the number of correct predictions you made, times 50 cents. For example, if you reported that 7 participants would choose A and 3 participants would choose B and we find that in fact 4 participants have chosen A and 6 participants have chosen B, you correctly guessed 4 A--choices and 3 B--choices and you will earn 7*50 cents is 3.50 euros.
Of course, the sum of your predictions for A and B choices have to add up to 10.
Procedure per period
In each period you have to 
Part 1 earnings
You will be informed about your earnings from Part 1 after the last period of the second part of the experiment. For Part 1, you will be paid the results of:
1. one period of the first part in which you did have the right to play 2. The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see previous page). Now there are two possible cases:
o Your asking price was lower than the fixed offer, you have sold your right and your earnings are equal to the fixed offer.
o Your asking price was higher than the fixed offer, so you have kept your right to play. The computer will couple you with another participant who also has the right to play and your earnings are determined by your choice and the choice of the participant you are coupled with according to the payoff table of the game.
3. one period of the first part in which you did not have the right to play 4. The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see previous page). Now there are two possible cases:
o Your offer was lower than the fixed offer. This means you will not play the game.
o Your offer was higher than the fixed offer. This means that you have bought the right to play, and you pay the amount of the fixed offer. The computer will couple you with another participant who also has the right to play and your earnings are determined by your choice and the choice of the participant you are coupled with according to the payoff table of the game.
5. We will for one randomly chosen period determine your prediction earnings. The computer will randomly choose 10 participants (other than you) and compare your predictions with their choices according to the rule explained in the previous screen.
Note that depending on your decisions, you may incur losses. In this case, your show--up fee of 7 euros will be used to cover them. However, you will never end up owing us money.
Complications: odd number of players
You may wonder what happens when we have an odd number of participants with a right to play the game. We solve this problem in the following way. Before the experiment started, we have for each period separately randomly assigned one participant as the "odd player". Nobody will know who this is. If the offers of the participants combined with the offer in the envelop is such that we would have an odd number of players, the outcome for this "odd player" will not be according to his or her preferences. For example, we play out a period in which 11 participants have bought the right to play. If the "odd player" is one of these 11 players he will not buy the right to play the game and thus not play the game. If the "odd player" did not buy the right to play, he has to buy it anyhow for the fixed offer and play the game.
Note that there is a 50% probability that this will happen, and the probability that you will be the "odd player" is only 1 divided by the number of participants in this session. So if we have 20 participants there is a probability of 1/20 * 1/2= 2.5% that your earnings are not determined by your choices, and thus with 97.5% probability your choices will determine you earnings. So it is still very important that you make the choices you consider to be best!
Practice Questions
We will now ask you some questions to check your understanding. You can always browse back to previous screens. When you have a question for the experimenter please raise your hand. Please note that the situations described below are hypothetical. In the experiment, decisions and earnings will depend on the actual choices of the participants.
A. Consider the game displayed above. What will be your earnings when you have chosen B and the other player has chosen A when the game is played?
B.
What will be the earnings of the other player when you have chosen A and the other player has chosen B when the game is played?
C. You predicted than 3 players will have chosen A and 7 will have chosen B. We find that in fact that 6 players have played A and 4 players B. What are your earnings in euros if this period predictions will be paid?
D. This period you have the right to play the game. The minimum amount that you are willing to accept in exchange for your right to play was 5.25. The fixed offer in the envelope is 6. This period you do not have the right to play the game. The maximum amount you are willing to pay to buy the right to play this game was 7 and the fixed offer in the envelope is 6.
¢ I buy the right to play for 6 ¢ I buy the right to play for 7 ¢ I don't buy the right to play and I will not play the game
Instructions Part 2
This part of the experiment will consist of 54 periods.
In each period you will be presented with a lottery. Below you see an example of such lottery.
This lottery offers a 60% chance of winning 5 euros, and a 40% chance of winning 0 euros.
In some periods you own the right to play this lottery and we will ask you for the minimum amount you are willing to accept in exchange for your right to play this lottery.
In other periods you don't own the right to play this lottery, and we will ask you for the maximum amount you are willing to pay to buy the right to play this lottery.
Like in the first part of the experiment, your offer will be compared with a fixed offer that is randomly drawn before the start of the experiment (and is in the envelope on the whiteboard).
At the end of the experiment two periods of part 2 will be played for money: one where you did own the right to play the lottery and one where you didn't have that right.
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to your offer and to the offers of all other persons in the room. If your offer is more than or the same as the fixed offer, then you buy the item. You had the high offer, so you are the buyer. But, here's the interesting part: You do not pay the amount you offered. Instead, you pay the fixed offer, an amount equal to or less than your offer.
The key to determining the maximum you'd be willing to pay is remembering that you will not pay the amount you bid. Instead, if you pay anything, you will pay the fixed offer.
Selling task
The selling task works as follows. The experimenter wishes to buy an item that you own. Your task is to make an offer for the item. As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the minimum you would be willing to accept and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this amount, and it will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the minimum you would be willing to accept and make that amount your offer.
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to your offer and to the offers of all other persons in the room. If your offer is less than or the same as the fixed offer, then you sell the item. You had the low offer, so you are the seller. But, here's the interesting part. You do not receive your offer. Instead, you receive the fixed offer, a price equal to or higher than your offer.
As a seller, you should offer the minimum amount you would be willing to accept in exchange for the item you own. Just as you saw in the case of the buying task, your best strategy is to determine your personal value for the item and record that value as your offer. There is not necessarily a "correct" value. Personal values can differ from individual to individual.
The key to determining the minimum you'd be willing to accept is remembering that you will not receive the amount you ask for. Instead, if you receive anything, you will always get the fixed offer.
Offers in the buying or selling task
The item you buy or sell is the right to play a game
What action do you choose?
In each game we will ask you what action (A or B) you choose, if you would have the right to play this game. If, at the end of the experiment, that period is (randomly) chosen to paid, we will open an envelop to find the fixed offer and first determine whether you have the right to play the game. If you have this right (either because you had the right to start with and didn't sell it, or because you purchased that right), you payoff will be determined by the action you have chosen and the action of another player in this room you will be coupled with.
What action do you expect others to choose?
In addition we are interested in your expectations about the behaviour of other players in this game. In each period we ask you how many out of 10 randomly drawn participants in this room will have chosen A and B. You will fill in these expectations in the cells below the table of the game.
Procedure per period
In each period you have to 4. Choose an action A or B; 5. Predict how many of 10 others in this room will choose A and B; 6. formulate an offer for which you are o willing to sell the right to play this game (in periods you have this right) o willing to pay for the right to play this game (in periods you don't have this right)
Part 1 earnings
You will be informed about your earnings from Part 1 after the last period of the second part of the experiment. For Part 1, you will be paid the results of: 6. one period of the first part in which you did have the right to play The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see previous page). Now there are two possible cases:
o Your asking price was lower than the fixed offer, you have sold your right and your earnings are equal to the fixed offer. o Your asking price was higher than the fixed offer, so you have kept your right to play. The computer will couple you with another participant who also has the right to play and your earnings are determined by your choice and the choice of the participant you are coupled with according to the payoff table of the game. 7. one period of the first part in which you did not have the right to play
The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see previous page). Now there are two possible cases:
o Your offer was lower than the fixed offer. This means you will not play the game. o Your offer was higher than the fixed offer. This means that you have bought the right to play, and you pay the amount of the fixed offer. The computer will couple you with another participant who also has the right to play and your earnings are determined by your choice and the choice of the participant you are coupled with according to the payoff table of the game. 8. We will for one randomly chosen period determine your prediction earnings. The computer will randomly choose 10 participants (other than you) and compare your predictions with their choices according to the rule explained in the previous screen. Note that depending on your decisions, you may incur losses. In this case, your show--up fee of 7 euros will be used to cover them. However, you will never end up owing us money.
